RADICAL MEDIA IN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: THEORETICAL EXAMINATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The media have become the main platform for intercultural communication. If the media are able to shape and frame the process of intercultural communication, what does it mean to minorities? One way for them to gain equal status in intercultural communication is producing their own media. However, entering public sphere without the intermediacy of mainstream media often fails, since minorities’ media are not only unable to reach broad public, but they also reproduce the economic, political and social status quo, much like mainstream media. I argue that the solution to the restricted and unequal access of minorities to public sphere, and as such to intercultural communication, is provided by radical media. Therefore, I propose a model of intercultural public sphere comprised of minorities’ own media, radical media and mainstream media. In this model radical media occupy the center place, acting as an intermediary between the former and the latter.

Keywords: Intercultural communication, radical media, public sphere, hegemony, identity

INTRODUCTION

The media have become the main platform for intercultural communication. What we know about foreign countries, their peoples and cultures, we know it mainly from mass media. Moreover, it is the media that tell us what to think about them, as it is the media that set “a system of common values, ideas and practices that enable people to understand each other and communicate about similar issues” (Howarth, 2011: 153). If the media are able to shape and frame the process of intercultural communication, what does it mean to minorities? There is no doubt that contemporary mainstream media belong to economic, political and social elites and, first and foremost, represent their point of view. Consequently, also the depiction of ethnic, cultural or sexual minorities by mainstream media mirrors the stereotypes and visions shared by the elites. In other words, the representation of minorities in mainstream media and public sphere as a whole tends to be oversimplified and as such destructive to the process of intercultural communication.

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One way for minorities to gain equal status in intercultural communication is producing their own media. However, entering public sphere without the intermediacy of mainstream media often fails, since minorities’ media are not only unable to reach broad public audience, but they also reproduce the economic, political and social status quo, much like mainstream media. This is why I propose to analyze the process of intercultural communication from the perspective of radical media. In this article I argue that the solution to the restricted and unequal access of minorities to public sphere, and as such to the entire process of intercultural communication, is provided by radical media. Therefore, I propose a model of intercultural public sphere comprised of minorities’ own media, radical media and mainstream media. In this model radical media occupy the centre place, acting as an intermediary between the former and the latter, giving minorities space where they can develop their identity and/or design new ones and through which they can access public sphere on equal terms. As such, this paper is located within the critical theory of communication, as it seeks “emancipatory social change through critical reflection on social practices” (Potter et al., 1993: 319).

In the first part of the article I examine previous studies on intercultural communication, radical media and public sphere. Apart from providing definitions of key terms, I focus on theoretical findings, which are later employed to build a model of intercultural public sphere. In the second part of the article, I test the model by performing historical analysis of two case studies: carnivals and U.S. radical press at the onset of the 20th century. The paper’s findings should provide background for future research on intercultural communication, especially in regard to the role of radical media in that process.

**WHAT EXACTLY IS INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION?**

It is difficult to define such a complicated and capacious phenomena as intercultural communication. Even its very name varies, depending on what exactly scholars want it to describe. Intercultural communication, cross-cultural communication, intracultural communication, international communication - all these terms involve an act of communication performed in a multicultural environment. Whereas international communication generally regards communication of nation-states or rather their official institutions, intracultural communication takes place between individuals with a shared cultural background. The remaining two types of communication - cross-cultural and intercultural - describe a situation when “the people creating shared meanings have different cultural perspectives and values” (Sadri, Flammia, 2011: 11). Such communication may occur between individuals or groups of individuals from different countries or within one country. By consequence, most scholars distinguish between cross-cultural communication, as involving communication across cultures, and intercultural communication where communication occurs between people from different cultures (Gudykunst, 2003: 1). The difference between cross-cultural communication and intercultural communication may seem blurred at best, and often scholars use these two terms interchangeably. Others, however, argue that cross-cultural usually refers to comparing phenomena across cultures whereas intercultural stands for interactions among people of diverse cultures (Jandt, 2010: 45). In other words, intercultural communication is “what happens when the two (or more) culturally-different groups come together, interact and communicate” (González 2011).
As this definition describes the type of communication I analyze in this text, I will thus use it in the following sections whenever I refer to intercultural communication.

What communication means seems obvious, but how to explain the concept of “culture”? In fact, part of the problem with defining intercultural communication is that culture can be understood in multiple ways. As Hall (2005: 13) points out, culture cannot be “tested” empirically, and each definition implies a different programme of work. Consequently, “culture is man’s medium; there is not one aspect of human life that is not touched and altered by culture” (Hall, 1976: 16). However, without going deep into various theories of culture, we can assume it to be a “broad collection of values, ideas and practices that define a particular group or community… Culture is something produced in and struggled over in communicative practices” (Howarth, 2011: 318). Culture affects the process of communication as it impacts how we think and how we judge other people. It also sets the rules of conduct that establish the frames of communication with others. Since culture involves symbols, meanings, and codes of behavior (e.g. language, norms, laws, socialization practices) transmitted from generation to generation, simultaneously it sets up “firewalls” that make the proper communication with others difficult or even impossible. Culture creates structures within which we function, and which separate us from other cultures. In other words, “the extent to which culture affects communication between people from different cultural groups is a function of the dissimilarity between the cultures, rules, or self-concepts” (Cushman, Cahn, 1985: 136). By consequence, intercultural communication may either lead to a dialogue or conflict. The outcome of this process depends on various factors, such as communication skills of its participants (e.g. awareness of others) and the presence and role of intermediaries (e.g. media).

THE EMERGENCE OF INTERCULTURAL PUBLIC SPHERE

As it has already been mentioned, the process of intercultural communication may occur between individuals or between groups of individuals. Large groups, such as nations or minorities communicate with one another via various intermediaries (mediators), mostly mass media. In fact, “the role of intermediary or mediator of social communication is an intrinsic part of the media” (Lazâr, 2012: 291). As an intermediary in the process of intercultural communication, media create symbolic spaces - or public sphere - where public debate and argument are facilitated, and judgments are formed (Habermas, 1996: 360). Here, various groups of different cultural background may exchange their opinions in order to form consensus. We can thus repeat after Habermas (1991: 27) that public sphere is “the sphere of private people come together as a public.” In its normative sense, public sphere can be regarded as a “free market of ideas” that is built on three pillars: the existence of toleration of diversity of opinions, the encouragement of diversity, and the belief that open discussion leads to the triumph of truth (Kessler, 1984: 9). Such public sphere facilitates dialogue and mutual understanding. What is more, it empowers its participants. As Kellner (2004: 5) points out, in public sphere “ordinary citizens could participate in political discussion and debate, organize, and struggle against unjust authority, while militating for social change…. By participating in public sphere various minorities engage themselves in the process of intercultural communication, freeing themselves of subjectivity and becoming active members of the society in which, they function.
The process of empowerment of minorities through public sphere becomes twofold. First, minorities gain access to public debate; second, they become recognized by the majority as an equal participant. Minority groups can achieve these goals by producing their own media (ethnic media, diasporic media, etc.) or by gaining access to mainstream media. With the development of social media, also this channel of communication has been widely used in favor of intercultural communication. In order for intercultural public sphere to emerge and develop certain conditions must be met, i.a. fairness of access and balance. It is worth repeating after Fraser (1992: 127) that “the concept of a public presupposes a plurality of perspectives among those who participate within it, thereby allowing for internal differences and antagonisms and discouraging reified blocs.” Only under such conditions, can public sphere facilitate intercultural communication and, in effect, empower minority groups.

It must be remembered, however, that public sphere can also limit discussion and narrow the flow of thought. In other words, instead of aiding intercultural communication, it may disrupt dialogue and cause conflict. For example, Griffin (1996: 3) compares public sphere to an ideology, which “functions to set boundaries around human interactions, boundaries that have come to be seen as ‘right’ that rarely are challenged with any success.” Aside from ideology, also various commercial demands, e.g. mass media’s dependence on advertisement, confine and undermine the “marketplace of ideas” (Entman, 1989: 18). Such a restricted public sphere works then as a tool to marginalize or even exclude various minority (ethnic, cultural, sexual, etc.) voices. Modern public sphere is dominated by mass media and, in consequence, “does not allow more than relatively small numbers of citizens to be co-present” (Dahlgren, 1995: 8). Herman and Chomsky (1988) go even further and suggest that the mainstream mass media "manufacture consent" through a "propaganda model," which reproduces hegemonic voices of the elites. Public sphere serves thus, first and foremost, to define and rank groups "in terms of their access to varying degrees of power and privilege" (Jiwani, 2006: 9). Therefore, any alternative opinions are excluded from public sphere through the construction of such concepts as racism, sexism, classism or homophobia.

This restricting feature of mainstream public sphere is then replicated in minority public spheres - or public sphericules. As Georgiou (2012: ix) points out, minority media “reflect a world of itself: rich, powerful, contested, and torn apart by power struggles within and with the hegemonic system of media power.” Media produced by minorities and for minorities usually operate under the same legal and social frames as mainstream public sphere. As a result of it, some groups within a minority, such as women or homosexuals, may still face multiple forms of marginalization from public sphere. For this reason, the role of minority (diasporic) media as a facilitator of intercultural communication must be questioned. It is worth remembering that, first and foremost, they are directed at the members of a minority, whereas for the remaining part of society they often remain invisible. Therefore, they role in intercultural communication is limited. Scholars who research on ethnic media agree that their main function is to build and/ or reinforce ethnic identity. For example, according to Kuzniewski and his studies on the Polish-American press, it served as a "super-territorial instrument for communication" and a carrier of news of the new and old countries (Kuzniewski, 1987: 276). Also, more general studies on diasporic media indicate that they create "open space for a self-reflective discourse among migrants".
“reinforce identities and sense of belonging”, and provide “locally vital information to immigrants in the host society.” (Ogunyemi, 2015: 1).

As such, diasporic media play an active role in negotiating a minority’s collective identity and its place in mainstream public sphere. In fact, they contribute to the ethnic diversity of public sphere (Husband 2000: 206). This representation, however, tends to reproduce stereotypes and emotions, especially in regard to minority voices within the minority (Georgiou, 2006: 95). In other words, ethnic (diasporic) media “manufacture consent”, much like the mainstream media, and as such maintain hegemonic domination of the elite. It should be kept in mind that “alternative practices and discourses do not always look for a deconstruction of the hegemonic principles but instead they participate in the struggle for power with a certain ‘space of possibles’” (Vecino et al., 2015:). Moreover, as Georgiou (2015: 99) points out, “minority media are indeed platforms from which different dimensions of power are exerted. The defense of migrants’ rights coexists with other political and economic interests.” As a result of it, the identity constructed by minority media mirrors the identity established by the elites, and this may differ - in fact quite significantly - from how the remaining part of the minority perceive themselves. It must be also remembered that each minority group hardly ever is ethnically, culturally or politically homogeneous. For example, Marwick (2013: 355) criticises the perception of identity as a one-dimensional phenomenon, pointing out that “thinking of identity as static makes it possible to group people based on characteristics such as race, class, and gender, whether for demographic or political purposes.”

MEDIA AND IDENTITIES

In consequence, media-built collective identity highlights certain aspects of a group while downplaying or excluding others. As diasporic media focus on the construction of ethnic identity, other forms of identification (e.g. based on gender or sexuality) are marginalized. For example, in her analysis of the visual portrayal of women in diasporic Latina and mainstream Glamour magazines, Mayorga (2007: 103-104) found out that the former offered “an essentialist, racialized view of the Hispanic/ Latino community and it overlooked its diversity.” Although, the Latina magazine to some extent did empower its readers, for example by promoting education and independence, it built a pan-ethnic identity that created problems not only with “the individual’s self-concept, but also between the individual and the ethnic membership and/ or between the ethnic membership and the general culture” (Mayorga 2007: 105).

Being focused on ethnicity and/or race, ethnic media seem unable to create a “multiple minority identity”, which - apart from ethnicity - would also include sexual orientation, physical disability status, religion, age, and economic status (Vasquez, 2012: xi). It must be remembered that the term “minority” has many connotations and may apply to a number of features. Applegate (2011: 87) reminds us that “minority frequently means roughly what those who use it intend it to mean. Furthermore, minorities are not cemented in hard and fixed stratified areas. There is considerable crossing of lines. An individual may be considered a minority group-member in one classification and not in another.”

Ethnic media not only reinforce stereotypes within a minority but also eventually foster assimilation with the majority. For example, Riggins (1992: 122), who researched on the Canadian native press, found out that minority media are often
“conservative and accommodating and that surreptitiously reinforce assimilationist drives.” This takes place at two levels. At the first level, ethnic media inform about the new country, its rules, customs and culture, trying to explain them to their receivers and make them more accessible for them. Therefore, ethnic media facilitate assimilation to the prevailing culture and values. At the second level, ethnic media operate within the larger media system and as such maintain status quo. In other words, they refrain from voicing radical issues and ideas, choosing instead fostering assimilation to the economic, social and political mainstream. Unsurprisingly, even those studies that perceive diasporic media as a tool of maintaining ethnic identity, admit that they eventually facilitate assimilation. For example, the Polish-American press played a leading role in building ethnic identity among Polish immigrants at the onset of the 20th century; nevertheless, it later actively participated in the Americanization campaign, with the growing number of papers being published in English. According to Subervi-Velez (1986: 73), who recapitulated previous research on the ethnic press, “the ethnic media serve as vehicles for migrant ethnics to learn about and accommodate to the adopted land.” Such media may provide necessary information for their consumers but are largely unable to enhance socio-political agenda and development.

RADICAL MEDIA AS A PLATFORM FOR MINORITIES

In this article, I argue that the solution to the limiting access of minorities to public sphere, and as such to the entire process of intercultural communication, is provided by radical media. Being aware of the problems with the proper definition of such media or even their very name (alternative, activist, community, public, radical, etc.), I consider them as generally “media produced by the socially, culturally and politically excluded” (“Alternative Media Handbook” 2007). For these reasons, some scholars regard as radical also ethnic and religious media. However, their ethnic or religious affiliation cannot be the only or even overriding factor in including them into the category of radical media. As Atton and Hamilton (2008:1) argue, such media must meet far more features. They consider radical media as those that reject the very foundations of the mainstream, i.a. conventions of news sources and representation, the inverted pyramid of news texts, the hierarchical and capitalized economy of commercial journalism, and the subordinate role of audience as the receiver. Radical media usually are small-scale, short-termed and rejected by general public. Nevertheless, they serve two main purposes: “To express opposition vertically from subordinate quarters directly at the power structure and against its behavior” and “to build support, solidarity, and networking laterally against policies or even against the very survival of the power structure. In any given instance, both vertical and lateral purposes may be involved” (Downing, 2001: ix).

The very nature of radical media makes them an important element of intercultural communication. As Hardy (2014) explains, radical media “can challenge and contest dominant media power, can advance and realise different kinds of communication that those available across ‘mainstream’ media.” Forde (2017: 90) adds that even less ideologically radical, such as community media, are “designed to give voice and empower minority groups.”

From the above it can be assumed that radical media serve, first and foremost, to empower minority groups. They are a platform through which people can define themselves and participate in public sphere that otherwise would remain impenetrable
for them. Rodriguez (2011: 24) considers them as “communication spaces” where people “can learn to manipulate their own languages, codes, signs, and symbols, empowering them to name the world in their own terms.” Even though in her works, Rodriguez prefers the term “citizens’ media” to radical media, as the former seems to be excluding all those whose legal status remains unspecified, the definition provided by her can be applied to radical media as well.

Radical media create “counter public sphere”, in which minorities gain voice and establish their subjectivity and through which they can reach mainstream public sphere. It also redefines what is public and what is private. As a result of it, radical public sphere empowers minorities as participation in such a public sphere is a necessary step to engage in intercultural communication and the entire democratic political practice. In this sense, counter public sphere can be considered as a “working ground” for various minorities, a sphere where they can develop and practice their communication literacy before accessing mainstream public sphere. According to Fraser (1990: 68) counter publics “function as bases and training rounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics.” Moreover, they “enhance dialogue and democracy, help in exchanging views, form collectives and organize struggle” (Zervou, 2017: 138).

It must be remembered that in terms of intercultural communication, counter public spheres established by radical media differ in several aspects from the counter sphere created by ethnic (diasporic) media. First of all, radical media are open for general public, which means that they are both created and received by various groups within a society. This feature derives from the fact that radical media's internal organization is far less hegemonic that mainstream media. In other words, the division into journalists, producers, and receivers is flexible or completely indistinct, which allows minorities to be engaged in the entire process of media production. As a result of it, radical media become a platform for intercultural communication. Such a platform does not exclude any minorities and identities, unlike diasporic media, which tend to focus on collective ethnic identity and limit all others.

The second aspect concerns the role of radical media as a tool of undermining economic, social, and political status quo. It may seem that this feature has little or nothing to do with intercultural communication. On the second thought, however, questioning status quo is what empowers minorities - either within their collective ethnic identity or in the entire society. In other words, minorities use radical media to communicate their real (instead of perceived) goals and demands to broader public. Another aspect of radical public sphere, which can be applied to intercultural communication, is its ability to influence mainstream public sphere. Pressured by the former, the latter becomes more open for various voices and in this sense more multicultural. Even though it is difficult to evaluate the impact of radical media on the mainstream, it can be concluded that they are “of considerable, if varying significance because it is they that typically first articulate and diffuse the issues, the analyses, and the challenges of the movements” (Downing, 2001: 30).

Radical media in the process of intercultural communication should not be considered separately from other media but analyzed within the entire media system. In this respect, this global and continuous feature of intercultural communication mirrors the functioning of public sphere. As Risse (2010: 125) points out, public sphere is first and foremost a social construct that emerges “in the process during which
people engage one another and debate issues of common concern in the public.” Minorities can communicate their opinions and goals to the rest of society through various media outlets, including their own media, radical media, and mainstream media. As it has been noted above, all of these media have their own individual features that provide minorities with different levels of freedom of expression. By consequence, each type of media varies in their ability to empower minority and facilitate intercultural communication. Still, altogether, the media participate in the process of intercultural communication and as such comprise intercultural public sphere.

![Figure 1: How minorities use different types of media to access public sphere.](image)

**MODEL OF INTERCULTURAL PUBLIC SPHERE**

Depending on which type of media minorities use, the process of intercultural communication can be divided into three basic stages. All these stages take place parallel to each other, comprising - in effect - intercultural public sphere. It must be noted, however, that each stage performs different functions. In the first stage, minorities participate in mediated intercultural communication by using their own media. Although there are many reasons why one’s own media are preferred to others, e.g. their accessibility and shared language, it must be remembered that such media often fail to reach broader public, being locked in a “minority ghetto” (Atton, Hamilton, 2002: 33-35). Thus, their role in fostering intercultural communication seems limited. Clearly, in this stage, minorities’ main task is, first and foremost, to mark their presence in public sphere and establish basic identities.

The second stage involves radical media. Since they are produced and received by various groups of different ethnic or cultural background, the process of intercultural communication is here the most vivid and unimpeded by external factors. As Downing (2001: 34) points out, radical media serve as “catalysts of lateral communication enabling platforms of dialogue.” Radical media allow their users to mediate and establish their multiple identities, i.a. ethnic, cultural, sexual, etc. Unlike minorities’ own media, which define identity as a one-dimensional phenomenon or mainstream media that “polish up” all identities to correspond with the status quo, radical media mobilize themselves and respond to “the wider arena and take into account its many forms and viewpoints” (Rennie, 2006: 19). Moreover, radical media redefine what belongs to personal sphere and what belongs to public sphere, including ethnic and
gender relations. For example, mainstream media often limit women to private sphere, by promoting conservative values and traditional gender roles. Radical media, on the other hand, provide “a challenge to the public/private dichotomy through its inherent changing of many dichotomous relations between production and consumption” (Kosut et al., 2012: 431). It can be thus assumed that intercultural communication mediated by radical media is not constrained by various factors, e.g. self-imposed identity as in case of minorities’ media or social and political limitations as in case of mainstream media. In this stage, radical media eliminate differences between minorities and the majority, allowing the former to voice their own opinions and ideas as equal. After marking their presence in public sphere, here minorities can communicate it and frame it according to their will.

In the third stage, intercultural communication is mediated by mainstream media. As it has been pointed out earlier, they dominate contemporary public sphere, therefore they exercise the greatest power over its ultimate shape. Since mainstream media - as Herman and Chomsky remind us - first and foremost “produce consent” to maintain economic, social and political status quo, they are difficult to access by minorities of any kind, especially ethnic minorities. Unsurprisingly, “there are systematic reasons to assume that mainstream media has resisted and will continue to resist the transnationalization of the public sphere” (Trenz, 2016: 18). In fact, which opinions and ideas voiced by minorities will eventually transpire to mainstream media and, in effect, to mainstream public sphere depend on how they fit the status quo. It means that minorities are allowed into mainstream public sphere as long as they support assimilation within the majority. This is why minorities’ own media remain conservative in their nature and establish one-dimensional, often stereotypical, identity, “digestible” for mainstream public sphere. Radical media, on the other hand, create and sustain actual identities and opinions that are later transmitted to mainstream public sphere (Downing, 2001: 44). In terms of intercultural communication, it is radical media that serve as a platform for minorities to enter mainstream public sphere as an equal participant. Whether minorities will maintain this equal position in communication with the majority in mainstream public sphere depends on the strength of radical media.

Figure 2: Model of intercultural public sphere.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In order to see how radical media facilitate intercultural communication and affect public sphere, let us analyze two examples of their usage. As the first example, I propose to scrutinize the idea of carnivals. Although the origins of “wild celebrations” can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome, it was the ascendance of Christianity that had deprived them of their spiritual character and given them the contemporary political form. Carnival as a form of manifestation of political and social ideas and a “critique of any hierarchical order” (Németh, 2007: 66) can be thus regarded as radical media, especially in terms of their role as providers of space for minorities. Let us repeat after Alferink (2012: 99) who writes that carnivals and similar festivals:

“... offer immigrants venues where they can assert and renew their collective identities, based on ethnic, religious or national commonalities. Festivals play an important role in the process of bonding. However, these large public gatherings also offer opportunities to build ties with the receiving society, a process that is known as bridging. And this takes the phenomenon of ethnic festivals right to the heart of the political agendas of various participants in both local and national politics.”

The ultimate shape of carnival, as well as frames in which it wants to present itself, result from mediated intercultural communication between minority and majority. Moreover, as carnival enforces itself into (mainstream) public sphere, it has the ability to oppose the status quo and introduce changes. As such, carnival presents a platform of social expression where political movements are fostered and where intercultural communication takes place in its unmitigated form. According to Leclair (2003: 7):

“Historically, carnival was a place where what was important in popular culture could be freely expressed. It embodied people’s own rituals, as opposed to the liturgical rituals and other activities imposed by the state and the church as Christianity began to take hold. The songs, satire, masks, puppets and pageants of carnival became a means for ordinary people to communicate ideas and express themselves in ways ordinarily frowned upon by an increasingly vigilant clergy.”

Much like other radical media, carnivals function under pressure from the elites who strive to “control carnivalesque expression, orienting it towards its harmonious and cathartic functions while eliminating its radical or revolutionary potential” (Carver, 2000: 34). There are examples of carnivals, e.g. Notting Hill Festival, which was originally established as the celebration of the Caribbean culture and its presence in Great Britain, but throughout the years has been deprived of its radical character and redefined as part of popular mainstream culture. Moreover, some members of society still perceive carnival as an “invasion of public space” and a “negative experience” that disrupts the established order. Nevertheless, carnival in its various forms has proved its ability to question and even change social and political norms. As Miller (1993: 1) points out, carnival “represents a licensed suspension and inversion of a dominant culture.” This is why it has always attracted various minorities. Not only does carnival allow minorities to mark their presence in society and, consequently, in public sphere; it also helps them to construct identity - or identities - that will function in the process of intercultural communication long after the carnival is over. Moreover, such an open and mass feature of carnival makes it noticeable in society and in public sphere. Alleyne-Dettmers (1997: 161) observes that carnival is “confronted with a discourse of dislocation, fragmentation and questions of belonging”, and at the same time it is “bound up with these ethnic minorities’ need to use that displacement to create other versions of imagined communities.”
Carnivals that take place in Europe or the Americas are platforms of expression of both: minority cultures and radical ideas. Apart from manifesting the presence of minority groups, carnivals empower them much like other radical media. Gypsies are one example. In his analysis of the history of carnivals, John Docker (1997: 188) points out that in the Middle Ages and Renaissance such festives emerged as mostly urban activity and were attended by all classes of inhabitants. What is more important, however, carnivals attracted foreigners, especially those perceived as “others” or “strangers”, such as Gypsies. On many occasions it was the first opportunity for them to communicate with the majority on equal terms as such was the idea of carnival - those who attended it agreed (at least symbolically) to abandon their privileges until the end of the carnival.

In the past carnivals played an important part in empowering Gypsies and other minorities. They were a platform through which they could publicly reinforce their own identity, as well as interact with others. As Silverman (1988: 266) concludes, for Gypsies “ethnicity involves the proud public presentation of distinctiveness.” In his opinion, Gypsies’ identification with their own identity consists of both: revealing and concealing, since “demonstrating, hiding, or exaggerating one’s Gypsiness is socially institutional” (1988: 266). It means, that much like other ethnic groups, also Gypsies need to communicate with “gazhe” (non-Gypsies) not only to demonstrate their presence and voice their ideas, but also to define their own identity in opposition to others. Carnivals provided a platform for such an interaction. During festivals, Gypsies were allowed to move freely and present their culture, as well as establish direct communication with the hosting majority. In this way, they reinforced their distinct identity, built in opposition to non-Gypsies, whereas at the same time also demonstrated their presence and position in society. Although, as some scholars point out, carnivals - as a form of intercultural communication - sometimes led (and still do) to the stigmatization of Gypsies, reinforcing prejudice towards them (Itcaina, 2017: 241), they often remained the only opportunity for Gypsies (and other minorities) to establish themselves as equals.

If we look at carnivals as radical media, we will notice their role of the intermediary and center place in the process of intercultural communication. As for Gypsies, they established their basic identity through their own media, e.g. songs and dances that were used to communicate within their own group. In another level of intercultural communication, Gypsies used carnivals to negotiate their place within society and, consequently, in public sphere. Whereas their own media allowed them to build one-dimensional identities, carnivals preferred multi identities, based on various elements, such as ethnicity, gender, sexuality or culture. Since carnivals took place on main streets (we could say in “mainstream media”), they became widely visible and as such were able to affect their global perception in a far greater way than minorities’ own media. Moreover, as carnival’s frames resulted from communication between various groups, such frames could later be used in public sphere.

Another example of how radical media facilitate intercultural communication in our model is provided by the U.S. radical press from the early 20th century. It should be remembered that it was the period when the United States experienced the mass influx of immigrants, mostly from Eastern and Southern Europe. Unlike Western Europeans, they were perceived by Americans as an economic, political and social threat to the very existence of their country. According to then popular racist theories,
the so-called new immigrants were supposed to be naturally unable to assimilate into the American society. Moreover, being brought up in autocratic countries, they could not comprehend democratic institutions and, by consequence, easily fell to radical ideas, such as anarchism, socialism and communism. Although immigrants established their own vibrant press industry, with Italian, Polish or Yiddish papers selling in tens of thousands of copies, the language barrier made it unable for most Americans to read them. Therefore, immigrants’ presses served, first and foremost, their own groups, and their impact on global intercultural communication was highly limited. Additionally, the ethnic press was largely conservative, fostering assimilation process, and as such was “doomed to disappear as the immigrants become fully assimilated and are not replenished by new immigration” (Myrdal, 1944: 208). Still, regardless of its inability to enter (mainstream) public sphere immigrant press established basic ethnic identities, which was the first step to the empowerment of minorities.

Not only were immigrants excluded from mainstream public sphere as foreigners, but also as members of the working class. As Le Blanc (1999: 69) puts it, “immigrant workers were especially targeted as a source of ‘un-American’ influences - in some cases because they were political radicals, in some cases because they wanted unions, in some cases because they came from cultures that were different from the White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant norms favored by self-styled ‘100 percent Americans.’” Facing such strong opposition from mainstream media and institutions, minorities could mark their presence and define their roles in U.S. public sphere on equal terms only through radical press. In the early 20th century, it was the papers published by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) that provided minorities with a platform to express themselves and confront general public. Not only did the IWW let immigrants into their ranks - unlike other labor unions - but also its non-hierarchical structure made it possible for them to participate - as equals - in the process of the creation of ideas, which later were voiced in the radical press. It was there that ethnic identities coalesced with labor and cultural identities, producing a media platform for a multi-dimensional identity, and becoming the source of empowerment for all. For example, Buhle (1978: 131), who analyzed Italian immigrants in Rhode Island, concludes that “through an aggressive industrial program that reconciled the practical and the ideal — the building of the union to replace the political State — Italian-American radicals sought to reverse in one sweep their isolation and powerlessness.”

It must be remembered that the process of empowerment of minorities through IWW radical press took place on several levels. First, the IWW participated in the construction of ethnic identities either by informing about their problems through its newspapers or by publishing foreign-language newspapers. In many cases, IWW periodicals were the first and only press title published in the language of a given minority. For example, Finnish immigrants “supported five daily newspapers in 1920, all reflecting labor and radical perspectives” (Park, 1922: 310). Second, the IWW developed other forms of minority identities, e.g. labor identity, gender identity, cultural identity etc. Third, through its media, the IWW allowed minorities to participate in public sphere on equal terms. It is true that radical papers were targeted by state and federal authorities and their role was thus diminished; nevertheless, they managed to reconfigure what belongs to private sphere and public sphere. For example, Michels (2005), who researched on the Jewish community in New York in the 1910s and 1920s, points out that radical newspapers in Yiddish not only created a radical public sphere, but also greatly shaped Jewish culture in America. Kazin (2011)
goes even further, claiming that American radical movements of the early 20th century managed to change the entire nation. Even though the historian does not mention public sphere as a distinct phenomenon, writing instead about culture and public debate in general, there is no doubt that without altering public sphere, there would be no changes in culture or social structures. In his opinion:

"Radicals in the U.S. have seldom mounted a serious challenge to those who held power in either the government or the economy. But they have done far better at helping to transform the moral culture, the "common sense" of society—how Americans understand what is just and what is unjust in the conduct of public affairs” (Kazin, 2011: xiii).

Naturally, the impact of radical media on U.S. public sphere was not limited to the presentation of various minorities and their identities. However, their role in facilitating intercultural communication cannot be overestimated. Radical periodicals served as a link between ethnic communities and the rest of the society, not only negotiating between various identities and points of view, at the same time protecting their equal positions, but also defining those identities and empowering them into public sphere. In other words, IWW periodicals performed several roles: they functioned as community media, labor media, and radical media that altogether allowed minorities into public sphere. We can repeat after Atton (2002: 6) that such media informed, reflected, and expressed experience on a daily basis, where the very process of their production empowered and established minorities in public sphere.

CONCLUSIONS

Theoretical findings cited in this paper support the argument that radical media play an important part in facilitating intercultural communication. Their non-hierarchical structure makes it possible for various minorities to define, negotiate and develop their identities on equal terms. Moreover, unlike diasporic media that focus on ethnic identity, radical media allow the construction of multiple identities, linking ethnic identity with class identity or sexual identity. This is why radical media are crucial for the establishment and development of intercultural public sphere. In the devised model of intercultural public sphere radical media function as an intermediary between minorities’ own media and mainstream media. The historical analysis of two examples of radical media: carnivals and IWW press in the US at the onset of the 20th century, has proved the usefulness of such a model for facilitating intercultural public sphere. Minorities’ own media often fail to reach broader public and tend to prefer ethnic identity over others, whereas mainstream media deprive minorities of all radicalism. Radical media lack these restraining features of the former and the latter, providing minorities with space to demonstrate their existence and allowing them to engage in intercultural public sphere on the same terms as the its other participants.
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