CONTESTED MODERNITIES: ‘DIVERSE VOICES’ OF THE PIONEERING JOURNALISTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE¹

BANU DAGTAS²

ABSTRACT
The history of journalism in Turkey, had moved in parallel to the history of modernization/Westernization which displays a top-down character. The first journalists (and novelists) after the Tanzimat of 1839 were state bureaucrats of the Ottoman administration. These “Young Ottomans”, or “Jenue Turks” as they were known, were in the vanguard of promoting a range of western ideas and concepts including: “journalism”, “public opinion”, “liberalism”, “constitutional monarchy”, “parliament”, “nation”, “nation-state”, and “modern family”. Most members of a group had tried to combine Western liberalism and Islam. This paper reviews the available analysis and commentary on the Young Ottomans in order to re-assess their role in the process of Turkish Modernization/Westernization. A close reading of the work and careers of these key figures reveals the contested nature of negotiations around the relations between modernity (and its secular impetus) and understanding of the Islam of that time. The tensions between these two World views—which is still an ongoing problematic issue.

Keywords: journalism, modernization, pioneer journalists of Turkey, Young Ottomans.

INTRODUCTION
The constitutional referendum of April 2017, the present Turkish government has consolidated its power. This referendum improved the polarization of a society that has continued for several years—as an outcome of the long run government of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) as a dominant party. This polarization has two main parameters. One is authoritarian rule of a government, mainly after 2007, seven years after coming to power. The second parameter is the Islamization of a society, which conflicts with the original project of the Republic founded, on resolutely secularist foundations. This tension between Islam and secularism not however new. As this paper sets out to demonstrate, it was a central axis of debate within the general

¹ This paper is based on the part of my Turkish book: Tanzimattan Sonra Yayincilik ve Roman- Yeni Osmanlilar ve Tezli Roman, Ankara: Utopya, 2015 (Publication and Novel After Tanzimat- Young Ottomans and the Novels Having Thesis).
² Anadolu University Department of Journalism, Turkey. banudagtas@gmail.com
movement to ‘modernise’ the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. It was articulated with particular force and clarity in the writings of leading members of the Young Ottomans, a group dominated by Western educated members of the bureaucratic elite who championed political and social ideas and institutions imported from Western Europe. This paper will examine the work of three key figures in this movement who exemplify the different ways that the tensions between Islam and western modernity were understood and tackled.

Ottoman – Turkish modernization, in a broad sense, can be defined as a both “voluntary” (Göle, 1998) and “top-down” process (Keyder 1998; Mardin 1992a; Kasaba 1998) realized by “ruling elites”. A considerable number of sociologists and intellectuals agree with the opinion that Ottoman – Turkish modernization is a type of “Westernization” (Berkes 2008; Göle 1998; Mardin 1992c; 1992c; Ortaylı 2006; Zürcher 2014). Nilüfer Göle (1998: 72) underlines that the terms ‘Westernization’ and ‘Europeanism’ that were used by mostly by the reformers of the 19th and 20th centuries refer to the institutions, ideas and manners borrowed from the west voluntarily. Göle (1998: 73) also defines Republican (1923) modernization as “total Westernization” and a “civilizing” (Elias 1978) project which embodied the Westernization of people’s life style.

Erik Jan Zürcher (1993; 2014), a well-known researcher, suggests in his book “History of Modernizing Turkey”, that the influence of Europe – especially Britain on Ottoman modernization was noticeable in three different fields that interact with each other: Ottoman’s increasingly enlarging economy becoming a part of capitalist world system; the increasing political influence of the leading powers of Europe and finally the effect of European ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, secularism and positivism (Zürcher 2014: 14-15). According to Zürcher (2014: 14), this political influence emerged due to Europe’s attempts both to disintegrate Ottoman Empire without causing a war in the region and to rule this empire while keeping it as a separate political entity.

Zürcher (2014: 16), conveniently summarizes the changes that the Ottoman Empire went through in the 19th century in interaction of Europe: The first period, which lasted from the French Revolution to the late 1830s, corresponds to the era of Sultan Mahmud II. This period was characterized by the economic unification of Balkan states and the emergence of Greek traders as dominant factors in the area. Again, in this period, Ottoman Empire established quite close relationships with British and Russian politics, the first nationalism movements started, and the first western type of reform attempts were initiated.

The era of Sultan Mahmud II is characterized by the following reforms that have the potential to effect on the intellectual life of the near future: the clothing revolution, the foundation of the postal service, the first census, the establishment of Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye (1883) where civil servants were trained at primary school level, the foundation of Mekteb-i Tibbiye (1827), which offered the first modern medicine education; Mekteb-i Harbiye, which offered modern military education, the launch of Takvim-i Vekayi (1831) - the first state newspaper; and the foundation of Tercüme
Odası (Translation Room)—that lead the rise of bureaucrats and intellectuals, sending some civil servants abroad as diplomats.

Zürcher (2014: 47) notes that the vast majority of Ottoman reformers had their first experiences in permanent embassies in Europe. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (2010: 124-125) claims that diplomats, especially Mustafa Sami and Sadık Rifat Pasha, influenced reformist movements by publishing books based on their observations of European civilization. In “Avrupa Risalesi” (European Tractate) (1840), Mustafa Sami argued that, the rise of European civilization depends on the following: the progress of positive sciences and enlightenment; religion freedom; and the continuity between the old and the new and the spread of literacy (quoted in Berkes 2013: 201-202). Sadık Rifat Pasha, the ambassador to Wien, listed the advancements and material facilities of Europe in similar terms, but as Berkes (2013: 202) notes his emphasis on the need for reform to be based on rational administration was even more important: "Reform action is a way of thinking before everything else. What is dominant in Europe is rational state administration based on human nature and of course ‘natural rights’, unlike an arbitrary system based on traditions”.

The period when the Young Ottomans were influential with their writings corresponds to “I Meşrutiyet” (constitutional monarchy) and is attributed to their effects on the political agenda. Zürcher (2014: 15) classifies the term "second period" of European influence on Ottoman modernization as lasting; from the end of the 1830s until the 1870s, when the "Tanzimat Pashas" were dominant in the government. According to Zürcher, this period is characterized by the following events and developments: adopting a free trade regime following the “Ottoman-British Trade Treaty” (1838); increasing trade volume and incurring debt; comprehensive reforms in law, education, finance and state institutions initiated by “Tanzimat Fermanı” (1839); the rise of modern bureaucracy as a power center, instead of old Empire’s bureaucracy; the rise of the Ottoman constitutional movement; the emergence of a Muslim response against the privileges given to Christians, at the end of the era following the heavy economic and political depression between 1873 and 1878 (Zürcher 2014: 16).

With the “Ottoman-British Trade Treaty” of 1838, Ottoman foreign trade volume increased by 80 percent and domestic crafts collapsed. This loss, then became one of the causes of anti-Westernization 'conservative' reactions. With the reforms of Tanzimat (1839) and Islahat (1856), which will be mentioned in more detail later, a bourgeoisie composed of non-Muslims who have obtained citizenship rights had begun to develop. At the same time, in the developed-port cities of the empire, especially in Istanbul, a "European life style" had emerged. The basic parameters of this lifestyle were the rise of consumer culture and mass entertainment and the emergence of an urban space to accommodate them. The names of the places such as department stores, cafes and restaurants located in Pera (Beyoğlu) İstanbul were in French. The French speaking by Hilmi Yavuz (2002), considered as the "metanomy of Ottoman modernization", is an important indicator of the tendency and westernization that spread between the rising bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic-intellectual part of the era. This attitude, which has been criticized by some characters created in the novels of the Young Ottomans.
Another important change observed in social life and the publishing sector in this period is the fact that women began to participate in the public sphere – though still in a limited way. The influence of the schools that had been opened up, as well as that fact that pioneering women were the daughters of the intellectual-bureaucrats, was also a significant influence.

It was within this general context of Ottoman-Turkish modernization that, the pioneer Turkish journalists began their publishing life in the second part of the 19th century. They launched their journalism and publishing initially as state bureaucrats and then continued as independent publishers with some Western support, along with the civil liberal organizations of that time. As a part of the modernizing elite, although they had ‘diverse voices’, they were mainly on the side of reconciling Western liberalism with Islam - a dilemma that persists to today. In this paper the ideas of three key pioneering figures of Turkish journalism will be examined, within the context of Ottoman modernization efforts and reforms, in the second part of 19th century. In the conclusion part of the study, the ‘contested modernities’- legacy of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization will be discussed.

THE RISE OF OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION: TANZIMAT (1839) AND ISLAHAT (1856) REFORMS

The period corresponding to the second half of 19th century, when Tanzimat and Islahat reforms were adopted in social life, is called the “Tanzimat Period”. The Tanzimat Fermanı (edict also called Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi), which was read aloud in Gülhane Square on November 3th 1839 by Mustafa Reşit Pasha in the name of Sultan Abdülmecit, was a document that guaranteed the lives and religious beliefs of the citizens and based this guarantee on the laws enacted and new regulations rather than the mercy of the Sultan (Ortaylı 2006: 99). Ortaylı (2006: 99) emphasizes that “Tanzimat Fermanı is considered as the beginning of our constitutional development and the first manifesto to become a state of law”.

Other amendments to the Tanzimat proclamation can be summarized as a new regular taxation that will replace the “iltizam system”- decentral taxation system in contrast to the old centralised taxation system of the Ottoman Empire; compulsory military service; and equality ensured by laws for all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs (Zürcher 2014: 84). These changes show that the Ottoman Empire took a big step towards becoming a "modern state"-recognizing “citizenship rights” underpinned by legal guarantees.

Ortaylı (1983: 1547) argues that the Tanzimat prepared an atmosphere for both Ottoman citizenship and Turkish nationalism-arguing that the main reason for the declaration of the Tanzimat was the rise of Balkan nationalism within the Empire. In this respect, Halil İnalcık (1983: 1536) underlines that Tanzimat Fermanı caused widespread movements in the empire and had traumatic effects on traditional social structures. And it did not stay as a “dead document”. The equality in taxation regulations, which was brought by Tanzimat Fermanı, was criticized by the groups who were negatively affected from its consequences. For instance, soup sellers, who used to pay low taxes, and imams, who were exempt from taxation, harshly reacted to these new regulations. In addition, because of imposing taxes on Christian foundations, which resulted in income loss for these institutions, clergymen, who had great influence on public opinion, started to support reformations (İnalcık 1983: 1539).
Prior to the Tanzimat Fermanı the word “Ottoman” had only been used as the name of the state beforehand, but now it also referred to “citizenship”. Ortaylı (1983: 1547) argues that the “Ottoman citizenship” allowed by Tanzimat Fermanı helped create a new - “Ottoman type intellectuals” educated by the educational institutions of Tanzimat and comprised of individuals from diverse religious and ethnic groups. At the same time, the Tanzimat reforms laid the basis for a “new type of bureaucracy”- called Bab-ı Ali, that gained political power over the Empire’s old type of administration- the Sultan and his men (Ahmad 2014; Berkes 2013; Mardin 1992a; Ortaylı 2005; Zürcher 2014).

According to Mesut Yeğen (1999: 48), what distinguishes Tanzimat from the previous reforms – in addition to military, financial, administrative and legal regulation- is the fact that the powerful states of the period had been forcing the Ottoman State to introduce certain reforms such as the regulations to give economic privileges to Western states in the Ottoman market and to better the conditions of non-Muslims in the state.

“İslahat Fermanı”, which was declared in 1856, is considered a significant reform in terms of adopting ‘modern citizenship’ in the context of providing equality for non-Muslim citizens before the law and realizing the promises of the Tanzimat. As Mardin (1992b: 14) has stressed, it was an initiative designed to establish an inclusive "Ottoman citizenship". At the same time, as Niyazi Berkes (2013: 228) has argued, it also strengthened the attempts by Christian communities to promote natinalization and secularism.

What did İslahat Fermanı introduce in terms of the rights? Non-Muslims were given the right to establish or repair institutions that function like schools, and churches; open investment areas; the right of mining and agricultural operations (Ortaylı 2006: 114). Berkes (2013: 216) states that İslahat Fermanı introduced concrete reforms to enable the realization of promises of the Tanzimat, rather than its quality of constitutionally: making a budget, establishing banks, encouraging European capital and experts to contribute economic development, establishing dual law-courts, abolishing “çizye” ( special tax was taken from non-Muslims before the İslahat reforms) to ensure equality between Muslim and Christian citizens, enacting compulsory military service for Christians. These developments caused reactions among Muslims towards the West. Mardin (1992b: 14) states: “It was observed that non-Muslims and foreigners took the advantage of legal rights given to them through Tanzimat to be better off than Muslim citizens with the help of financial, organizational and diplomatic support of the West”. Such changes in the sphere of economics, created a sort of “minority bourgeoisie” who were quite noticeable with their European life style.

Berkes (2013: 217) believes that when Tanzimat Fermanı (1839) did not provide a constitutional right to the Muslims, İslahat Fermanı (1856) in general sense maintained the beginning of a constitutional development of Christian ‘nations’ (non-Muslims people under the rule of Ottoman Empire are called as “nations” or “minorities”). Berkes also argues that İslahat Fermanı was the manifesto of the beginning of the national independence demands of the Christian ‘nations’. In fact, the nationalist movements that started later in Balkans were clear proof for Berkes’ ideas. Again, according to Berkes (2013: 228), İslahat Fermanı (1856) satisfied neither Muslim communities nor Church clergies, whose authorities were restrained with this edict.
First of all, non-clergy (secular) members were appointed to Church assemblies—elected by Christian citizens, expanding Christian communities' authority have expanded in the areas of religious, educational, administrative and civil affairs. According to Berkes (2013: 228), following military service and the adoption of the testimony and oaths of Christian citizens in the courts, the only missing characteristic that distinguished these communities from a nation was the lack of territorial independence and sovereignty.

The adoption of the “Habeas Corpus” principle within the “1858 Penal Code”, was an important codification that accompanied Islahat Fermanı, is now widely accepted as a step towards “secular jurisdiction” (Berkes 2013: 223; Göle 2008: 66; Ortaylı 2006: 181). However, as highlighted by Berkes (2013: 223), Ortaylı (2006: 181) and Üstel (2004: 27); the persistence of Islamic law and Sharia courts and "Divine law" alongside judicial courts and the practice of "law based on human reason" adopted from the West created a dual legal system. According to Füsun Üstel (2004: 27), such a dualist legal structure which was implemented after the Tanzimat and strengthened with the II. Meşrutiyet (1908), was the main obstacle in adopting the “constitutional citizenship” aimed at by political elites.

According to Zürcher (2014: 101), another important development during the Tanzimat period in terms of modernization/Westernization was the establishment of secular state schools, which spread rapidly during the rule of II. Abdülhamit (1876-1909). According to Zürcher (2014: 16), the era of Sultan Abdülhamit, which lasted between mid-1870s and the II. Meşrutiyet (1908), witnessed the following events: slower economic growth, the emergence of serious direct investments, ongoing administrative and technical reforms, the repression of nationalist and liberal ideologies, aiming to Islamic heritage of Ottoman Empire and replacement of the keeping political power between the the Sultan and his men-called “Palace” and the new type of bureaucracy. Towards the end of this period, both integration to international capital and political opponent movements inside the Empire (the movement of İttihak and Terakki) accelerated.

Like other researchers, Zürcher also claims that these schools educated the reformist staff to govern Ottoman State and Turkish Republic despite their mediocre quality level. Zürcher also (2014: 101-102) claims that, the education system was not suitable to inspire a feeling of national solidarity and common identity among educated elites, who still consisted of less than 10 percent of the population in the 19th century.

As a result, the Westernization introduced by the reforms of the Tanzimat period created some fault lines in the society. At the beginning of this process, Muslim subjects felt alienated and reacted against Western cultures, and the minorities and bureaucrats who were the practitioners of these reforms. As argued by Mardin (1995), in his “center-periphery conflict” model, the realization of the Tanzimat reforms led to the periphery-consisting of the majority of the society becoming more and more alienated from the centre-comprised of the royal people and bureaucrats.

Another source of opposition to the reforms came from the centre itself (Berkes 2013; Mardin 1995; Ortayli 2006; Zürcher 2014). The intellectual-bureaucrats embraced European currents of thought, especially "nationalism" and "liberalism", drawing on their knowledge of French, criticized the governance and luxury lifestyles of Tanzimat Pashas. It is from within this group that the "Young Ottomans" who deeply influenced the Ottoman-Turkish thought history and publishing life with their publications by the 1860 were drawn. In the next part of the study, the thoughts and
publications of this group—who were also “pioneer Turkish journalists”—will be examined.

IDEAS OF YOUNG OTTOMANS AS A PIONEER JOURNALISTS

The core of the "Young Ottomans" movement was laid with a secret association called "Meslek"—"Profession"—founded in 1865. Among the members of Young Ottomans who stood out at that period were Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Süavi, Ziya Paşa, Mizanc Murad, Ebüzziyya Tevfik, who dealt with publishing activities, as well as the authors and novelists such as Çapanoğlu Agâh Bey, Reşad Nuri, Beşir Fuat, Ahmed Mithad and Recaiçade Mahmut Ekrem. The important newspapers of the period were Tasvir-i Efkâr, Muhbir, Hürriyet and İbret newspapers. Mardin (2002: 46) states that the journalist Ebüzziyya Tevfik, who later joined them, outlined the agenda for debate at their first meeting: “The main points of the discussion and debate of that day are the following—the removal of the absolute Sultanate administration, the necessary precautions to put it in place of the Constitutional Monarchy […] The establishment of a secret organization to carry out these measures”. Zürcher highlights that ‘Young Ottomans had amazing influence in Turkey and beyond Turkey’ despite their unorganized activities:

Their indirect influence can be seen in the formation of the 1876 Constitution and the Ottoman constitutional movement based on their writings, which would oppose the Sultan Abdulhamit’s despotic administration in the aftermath of 1878, were mostly influential, even indirectly. Further, their, the way of reasoning that fused European liberalism and Islamic tradition, especially Namik Kemal, was taken over by Islamist reformers and found widespread support in the Islamic world […] The Young Ottomans can be considered as the first modern ideological movement of the Empire in the Ottoman elite class. Creating public opinion and trying to influence it through writings were done for the first time by this group (Zürcher 2014: 111-112).

The above-mentioned quotation taken from Zürcher underlines that the most noticeable characteristics of the Young Ottomans were their attempts to reconcile "European liberalism and Islamic Tradition", and their emergence as the first modern ideological movement, molding “public opinion” with their writings and forcing the Sultan to declare a constitutional monarchy. Similarly, Ergun Özbudun (2013: 22) states that Young Ottomans were strongly influenced by notions such as motherland, nation, freedom, equality and constitutionalism, which were the fundamental concepts of 19th century European liberalism. However, according to Özbudun, the Young Ottomans were trying to translate these concepts into Islamic terminology, such as “sûra” (shura-council) and “biat” (allegiance-commitment to Sultan without reasoning and to swear on commitment to Sultan).

According to Mardin (1998b: 59), the “Young Ottomans who were the supporters of the constitutional monarchy had the idea of representation as a tool to prevent the collapse of the Empire; their eulogy (praises) for freedom were directly related to their patriotism and this specificity was more noticable in the ideas of less romantic Jeune Turks of 1890s”. Koçak underlines that (2002: 82), the Young Ottomans’ constitutional monarchy project had a greater impact than they themselves expected: “It will maintain the social engineering project initiated in Ottoman-Turkish society as of 1860s, which refers to the process of creating a new modern society through a constitution”. What was important for Young Ottomans was “to save a state”, and this
tradition (of intellectuals’ saving the state through top-down regulations) was begun with the declaration of I. Meşrutiyet (constitutional monarchy). For this reason, according to Koçak (2002: 82), the Young Ottomans became a part of a past but; their political ideas were inherited by the next generations. In other words, their ideas were inherited firstly by İttihak ve Terakki (Union and Progress-Jeune Turks) and then by Kemalists”. The term “Kemalist” is used to refer to the followers of the Mustafa Kemal-founder leader of a Turkish Republic (1923). The term has two contrary referents: One referent is the “founders of the Republic”- positive/affirmative referent and the other “representatives of the official ideology of the state”, especially up to AKP power-negative/non-affirmative referent used by some part of socialists and also Islamists. Second referent especially related with the severe interpretation of secularism, accepting the military as the watch-dog of a Republic and also representative of the authoritarian single party era and monolithic understanding of a society.

Like Koçak and other researchers, Ortaylı (2006: 267) also claims that the Young Ottomans influenced the next political ideas and organizations. Ortaylı (2006: 264) also states that although Young Ottomans’ political ideas were based on “constitutional monarchy”, their common points were not great in number. Zürcher (2014: 109) states that the solution proposed by the Young Ottomans was “establishing a representative, constitutional and parliamentary government in the empire and ensuring a full citizenship and a feeling of commitment to the state for all Muslim and Non-Muslim Ottoman communities”.

In addition, Ortaylı (2006: 267) emphasizes that the role of the Young Ottomans cannot be confined to the struggle for parliamentarism and that this intellectual generation wrote about many issues ranging from literature to journalism and from bringing up a child to history and economy- called the attention of the society to these issues. They argued that the institutions in Ottoman society should change, and they discussed the status of these institutions in comparison to European civilization. Even the conservative thinkers among them re-evaluated and critised Ottoman institutions. Ortaylı (2006: 265) highlights the wide spread of their ideas as follows: “[...] The ideas of Young Ottomans form a colourful spectrum, from constitutional liberalism lines to modernist Islamism, even an immature Turkism and socialism. Even more interesting is that all these views can be found in the same person... Historical preoccupation of the Young Ottomans movement, subsequent political ideas and organizations, is sprinkled on their legacy”. According to Mardin (1998a: 16), the Young Ottomans did not develop political theory but rather belonged to the category of “hommes de letters”. Their thoughts, however, are of great importance in terms of grasping the meaning of the political beliefs of the first modern Turkish intellectual class.

When we ask the question of “who constituted the social base of Young Ottomans and how were they able to spread their ideas?”, the answer offered by Mardin (2002: 51-52) is that: “The social base of Young Ottomans were Tanzimat state hierarchy and with the degree of its development- Istanbul’s ‘society’, who were aware about the West [...] All Young Ottomans had close relationships with high state staff and gained experiences in state institutions”. According to Mardin (2002: 51-52), this social base changed with the Jeune Turks of the 1890s whose; main framework was not the “state” anymore but “college”. This next generation, who started the İtthah ve Terakki formation, were educated completely in Western type of educational institutions and
their origin was the school and not the state bureaucracy as in the case of Young Ottomans.

According to Ortaylı (1985: 1702), three pioneering individuals of Ottoman intellectual life in 1860s were particularly important and represent the wide spread of perspectives: Şinasi – with his secular-nationalist views, Namık Kemal – with his modernist-Islamist point of views, and Ali Süavi, whose ideas were between Islamism-secularism-Turkism – Ottomanism. In the next section the different ideas of Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ali Süavi as expressed through their novels and newspaper articles will be evaluated.


In addition to Takvim-i Vekayi, published by the state in 1831, and Ceride-i Havadis, published by a British in 1840, the history of the Ottoman press dates back to Tercüman-i Ahval, where İbrahim Şinasi Efendi worked as chief-editor in the early 1860s. Şinasi was educated in the 1850s (1849-1854) in Paris, where he encountered liberal views and returned to the country as a faithful modernization supporter. He started to publish his own newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar in 1862 and wrote dissenting writings against the authoritarian attitude of the government.

Mardin (2002: 44) argues that the “new discourse”, which goes in parallel with the definition of Young Ottomans, was adopted as a whole for the first time by Şinasi. According to Mardin, there had always been criticisms for what should be done to ensure the existence of the state in the Ottoman Empire. However, in addition to criticism in Şinasi’s writings, there were new thoughts. Mardin (2002: 44) argues that he stands out with his “attempt to systematically transfer the knowledge of the West” – which might be called a sort of “encyclopedism” in addition to his criticisms. So, Mardin describes the Tasvir-i Efkar, as “the first deeply-rooted modern newspaper”. By way of illustration, he gives the example of a book published by the Tasvir-i Efkar written by the Swiss Lawyer Vattel about natural law, between 1862-1865.

 Şinasi, through Tasvir-i Efkar, made it possible to reach a population of 2000-3000 people with a new Turkish language that can be understood by a wide audience (Mardin 2002: 45). Berkes (2013: 283) explains the fact that Şinasi was interested in language and meaning problems – even at an obsessive level- with reference to his notions of “secularism and nationalism”. According to Berkes, these notions could not have been understood and expressed if they had been written in the formal Ottoman language of the period.

According to Berkes (2013: 283), Şinasi believed that “political action cannot succeed unless the public is informed well, and if intellectuals do not succeed in language and meaning enlightenment and in the modernization of political language, their attempts will fail”. Berkes also underlines the fact that the Young Ottomans after Şinasi could not elaborate on religious, state and language issues in as detailed a way. Moran (1998: 15) argues that Şinasi believed in the necessity of the "linguistic refinement” to educate the public and thought that his newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar should function as a “school” to educate the public in this sense. According to Moran, this is what Şinasi expects from the new literature: "educating the public”. And Moran also argues that, Young Ottomans followed Şinasi’s way of thinking in this sense.
According to Mardin (2002: 44), the originality of Şinasi’s “discourse of the new” lies in the fact that he used the terms “heyet-i içtimaiye” (commission of assembly) and “heyet-i mecmua” (totality) which are equivalent to the concept of “society” in Western languages – to emphasize that “society is an object itself and a non-state organization”. By using these terms, Şinasi conceived of “society” as a collective structure of individuals rather than an Ottoman image of “tebaa”- loyalty of Ottoman citizens to the Sultan without reason. According to Mardin (2002: 44), even Namik Kemal, who was an admirer and the successor of Şinasi at Tasvir-i Efkâr, cannot be said to understand these novelties correctly. Therefore, Mardin uses the term “a westernizer without having inferiority complex” while defining Şinasi.

Mardin (1992a: 85) states that Şinasi criticized “being dependent on personal authorities” and believed in a civilization addressing to “literate” masses. Mardin thinks that Enlightenment philosophers were effective on Şinasi’s ideas together with the “book culture”- which created the atmosphere of the Enlightenment. He further adds that Şinasi’s ideas on “individual freedom” which were more modern than his society at that time- was inspired by the publications of the Enlightenment period, which he read during his Paris days, and by romantism, which gives a special importance to individual. According to Mardin (1992a: 85), At the same time, Şinasi realized that Western civilization was based on “impersonal relationships” in addition to the importance of individual and as Mardin underlines, was able to imagine terms that referred to the concept of “society”.

Şinasi greatly affected Namik Kemal who took over the newspaper when Şinasi went abroad. While Şinasi displayed a sort of encyclopaedist attitude, Namik Kemal was a “social trigger” to borrow a term from Mardin (2002). He succeeded in creating public opinion through his activities in journalism and literature and has passed into history as a most influential member of Young Ottomans.

Namik Kemal: Literature, Journalism and Public Opinion

Namik Kemal wrote newspaper columns that greatly influenced public opinion first for Hürriyet in 1868 and later for İbret as of 1870 and before he took over Tasvir-i Efkâr from Şinasi he worked for Muhbir, which he published together with Ali Süavi.

The newspaper İbret was the focal point of his ideas that had been reshaped since 1870 when, the Young Ottomans outside Ali Süavi returned home. According to Mardin (2002: 50), only Namik Kemal- among those who returned to the homeland- continued to produce serious ideas about politics, culture and Ottomanism. According to Aydin (1993: 131), Namik Kemal was the best representative of the intellectuals of that period with his ideas, educational background and political attitudes and also the most loyal follower of the ideology of the Young Ottomans. According to Tanpınar (2010: 312-390), his basic ideas are as follows: ideas of “liberty”, ideas of “law”, ideas on “individual” and “individual values”, the idea of “constitutional monarchy”, ideas of “economics” and ideas of “civilization”.

According to Zürcher (2014: 108), Namik Kemal ideas can be best summarized as the "defense of liberal values with Islamic evidence". According to Zürcher (2014: 109), Namik Kemal and the other Young Ottomans wanted to extend civic and state loyalty to the whole Muslim-non-Muslim population through a constitutional and parliamentary administration. On the other hand, they also advocated the return to Sharia principles that recognized the sovereignty of the people. Berkes (2013: 293) explains that Namik Kemal tried to hold to three “uncompromising propositions” which
he could not give up: “The absolute and abstract 'good' and 'bad' orders of God (as expressed in Sharia), the government and its laws (as expressed in conditional government-constitutional monarchy) and obeying the requirements of the era without adhering to a state-religion (as expressed in the idea of progress)”. Namik Kemal brought these three notions together: Sharia, constitutionalism and progress and fiercely defended their unity. According to Mardin (1992c: 61), Namik Kemal’s theories around the Sharia were informed by his “struggle to find the equivalent of natural law in the Ottoman world”.

At the same time, Berkes (2013: 300) argues that Namik Kemal insists on the supremacy of the Western civilization of the 19th century. He believes that the superior and beneficial aspects of Western civilization should be adopted unconditionally. He sees industry, technology, economy, military power, press and education as the essential building blocks of a modern "civilization". “Although he accepts the presence of good and bad sides of Western civilization, he cannot answer the question of how the rational, technical, and scientific aspects which comprise the good side of Western civilization are the product of Western culture, which he sees down to Islam and Islamic law” (Berkes 2013: 300). According to Berkes, this deficiency in Namik Kemal’s understanding of Western civilization is a reflection of the duality of Tanzimat- so criticized by him, and this contradiction is also reflected in the future. This problematic that Berkes argued, namely, "to take the technology of the West, to take its rational sides but reject the culture" has become a resident attitude, and it is an opinion that is lined by the majority conservatives. We can say that this problematic is discussed more systematically with the concepts of "hars" (culture) and "medeniyet" (civilization) in the works of Ziya Gökalp.

Berkes (2013: 292) explains the presence of conflicting ideas in Namik Kemal to the fact that he learnt the ideas of the philosophers like Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau from second hand resources and also to the fact that Young Ottomans were not revolutionist. According to him, Namik Kemal first accepted ideas with revolutionary consequences such as the “natural rights” and the “social contract” which he adopted during his time in Europe, to be compatible with Sharia. However, as the debate progressed, he started to see contradictions with the basic philosophy of contemporary democratic regimes and tried to prove that they can be reconciled with each other. Berkes (2013: 292-293) explains that because the Young Ottomans were not revolutionists they saw: “[…] Wishing to down Ali Pasha from the Grand Vizier and even Sultan Abdülaziz from the Sultanate as not a revolutionary thing, but a correcting mistake in a legitimate sovereignty”.

In sum, Namik Kemal created a new vocabulary by giving new meanings to old words and drew on the terminology of 19th century liberalism in order to explain these thoughts to the Ottoman people: He often used the word “vatan”- “homeland” in Arabic instead of the “patrie” in French, the word “hürriyet” instead of “liberte” and “millet” instead of “nation”. As it is known, these words become embedded in the language and are still very active today. Zürcher (2014: 109) emphasizes that this terminology, which Namik Kemal- coined, provided the ideological means for later libertarian and nationalist Muslim generations.
"Islamist-Turkist” Ali Süavi: Muhbir and Ulûm

Mainly considered as “Islamist” in the Young Ottomans movement, Ali Süavi was a preacher and teacher who received a religious education. As for social origin, he is known to have been much closer to the traditional part of the society (majority and having folk culture) compared to other Young Ottomans. Koçak (2002: 73) defines Ali Süavi as: “I suppose Ali Süavi is the most ‘strange’ of all these names. It is his distinguishing feature of his struggle to develop a right of the resistance and the theory with its proximity to the common people. It is also a name that he wanted to be active in the platform of political action”. Koçak (2002: 77) also emphasizes that Ali Süavi is a more radical profile within the Young Ottomans as a result of coming from the common people and speaking of some kind of courage, "a resistance and revolution based on ordinary people". According to him, an understanding of political struggle such as "being close to the lower classes of the society and winning their political support" is an undeveloped style in the Young Ottomans, who were themselves bureaucrats.

Mardin (2002: 47) also emphasizes that Ali Süavi, before he went to Europe to join the Young Ottomans, preached in various mosques in Istanbul and was eager to be a member of the Muslim clerics. Mardin argues that Ali Süavi should be described as "an autodidact who was educated with the system of neither full-western nor full Islamic". Described as an "Islamic agitator" in a German newspaper in 1867, he published the first Ottoman newspaper Muhbir in Europe, in London. He put the following sentence on his journal: "Muhbir finds a country that is not forbidden to say the truth and comes out again”(Tanpınar 2010: 215). Tanpınar (2010: 215-216) states that Ali Süavi described his newspaper - even starting from the first issues as published by an Islamic society that resides in Europe temporarily. This sentence caused conflicts between him and the Young Ottomans because he was seen to go beyond their predetermined goals. Later, he published “Ulûm” newspaper in Paris, and when he had to leave Paris for Lyon, he published the same newspaper under the name “Muvakkaten Ulûm Müşterilerine”.

In the words of Ortaylı (1985: 1702), Ali Süavi whose ideas were based on "Islamism-laicism-Turkism-Ottomanism" wrote about Turkism and Turkish arguing that; “Even the Qur’an can be translated. Only prayer must be Arabic. Because Arabic is not the language of the Arabs. It is the language of Islam. By using it in religious affairs, we preserve the Islamic unity” (Ortaylı 1985: 1702). These ideas will later be improved on by Cemaleddin-i Efganî and then passed on to the first Turkists (Tanpınar 2006: 225). According to him, it is wrong to use the term “Osmanlica” (Ottoman language) for “Turkish”. Defending the enrichment of Turkish from foreign sources like every language, he argues that it is a beautiful harmony and that better results can be obtained if simple and short sentences are written (Tanpınar 2010: 229). Mardin (2002: 48) emphasizes that both "rude", "Islamic preciousness" and "more popular" versions of Turkish were used in Muhbir and in all the writings of Süavi.

It is acknowledged that Ali Süavi had a great effect on the Turkism movement; however, it is also known that the resources he used were second hand and he did not have detailed knowledge. Based on Fuad Köprüülü, Tanpınar (2010: 227-228) argues that, although Ali Süavi did not get ideas of Turkism from the very deep sources, he nevertheless influenced the later Turkists. Mardin (2010) also emphasizes the concepts of "rebellion", "Turkism" and "Islamic justice" with regard to Ali Süavi who died during the “Çırağan Vakası” uprising, which he organized to bring Murat V to the throne.
Mardin (2002: 48) summarizes Ali Süavi’s ideas about “Islam Justice” as follows: “Ali Süavi’s political theory was to revive a justice in the form of ‘ihkak-ı hak’ - self receiving rights an Ottoman tradition. In fact, in case of the notion of ‘ihkak-ı hak’-self receiving rights, the concept of ‘right’ does not mean separation of power and the balance of powers. ‘Ihkak-ı hak’ means that to overcome the injustices lived by individuals and Sultan’s referee role assumed”.

According to Mardin, the system came out of here; domination over the people of the ümeran (the people authorized by the Sultan), domination of Ulema (the Islamic clerics) over orders, and domination of divine justice over Ulema. According to Mardin (2002: 48), this justice formulation of Ali Süavi “can provide a filter for the covert despotism, but it is not related with the democracy or left wing liberal political theory”. Ali Süavi, like Namik Kemal, suggests a system which will be based on the constitution, but when viewed in detail, is far from the idea of democracy further than Namik Kemal.

**CONTESTED MODERNITIES: FROM PAST TO TODAY**

Şınasi, an encylopedist and Westernist who is one of the pioneer journalists whose modernist ideas were examined in the context of Ottoman modernization, believed that the only universal civilization was Western civilization and that this civilization was based on rationality and positive law (Göle 1998: 71). Again, Şınasi has the ideas of individual freedom, and “society is an object on its own, a non-state institution, as an important foundation of western modernity” (Mardin 2002: 44). Namık Kemal thought that the liberal values of the West and the absolute truths of Islam could be reconciled. In his “Renan Müdafaanemesi” (Renan Defence) he disagrees with Renan, who claimed that “Islam was not able to internalize science and progress and integrate with itself (Göle 1998: 71).

Namik Kemal’s propositions for reconciliation are in summary: “The absolute and abstract ‘good’ and ‘bad’ orders of God (Sharia), the fact that the laws and the government are based on public will (constitutional monarchy), and and fulfilling the requirements of modern life without a need for state-religion distinction (progress)” (Berkes 2013: 293).

Ali Süavi, whose opinions are summarized in this study, also has the idea of reconciliation of constitutional government with Sharia. This way of thinking has also been adopted by conservative-Islamic movements among later generations. In terms of the conservatives, the superior aspects of the West are not individual freedom and secularism. They institutions such as technology, industrialization and modern education and the press- in short “development”.

Ziya Gökalp a follower of Emile Durkheim, he first occupant of a chair in sociology in France, and himself the first Turk sociologist, whose ideas on Turkish nationalism were quite influential between 1910s and early Republican period, distinguishes between "hars" (culture) and "medeniyet" (civilization). Gökalp argues that the backwardness of Islamic societies compared to the West, is not derived from the essence of Islam, as Renan defends. Rather it is due to historical reasons (Berkes 2013: 442). According to Gökalp, morality and law; religion and state differ from each other. Berkes (2013: 459), who has the leading analyst of secularism in Turkey, states that Ziya Gökalp published a memorandum in 1916, and the İttihat ve Terakki
Contested Modernities: ‘Diverse Voices’ of the Pioneering Journalists in the Ottoman Empire

(Union and Progress) in the administration then introduced some reforms that moved towards secularism.

These reforms, started in 1916. Sharia courts were taken from Şeyhülislamlık (the top institution of the sharia courts) and connected to the Ministry of Justice (as a means of secularizing justice). At the same time, administration of the religious schools, the madrasas, was transferred to the Ministry of Education as a step towards the unification of the education system in the early Republican period. Parallel to these reforms, in 1917, the enactment of the “Şeriat Mahkemeleri Usul-ü Muhakeme Kanunu” (Sharia Court Proceedings Law) was a step towards the integration and secularization of justice institutions. In the same year, “Aile Hakları Kanunu” (Family Rights Act) (1917) was enacted. This law was the pioneer of Civil Code adopted from the Swiss in early Republican period and the first family law for the Islamic world (Berkes 2013: 459-460).

With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1923), the founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk embarked on the path of embracing Western civilization in both its material and cultural aspects. According to Berkes (2013: 526), for Atatürk, Eastern civilization was Islamic civilization and Western civilization was "contemporary civilization". After the foundation of the Republic, the most important reform of the Atatürk government towards secularism was the removal of the Caliphate in 1924. With the removal of the Caliphate, the madrasas, tekke (dervishes’ place) and sects were removed and the visit to the shrine was forbidden. Again in 1924, the "Sharia Courts", in a very important step towards secular law, were abolished. In 1925, with the addition of the "Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu" (Law of Treachery to the Homeland), religious subjects were prevented from participating in party programs (Berkes 2013: 534). The reason for this is the opposition party program ("Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası"-Party of Republcan Progressive), founded in 1924 and then closed down. Also, the 1925 Sheikh Said Kurdish uprising was thought to involve the initiation of something and the religious objections of the rebellion (with the reason of the removal of the Caliphate).

Other reforms in the early Republican period (1923-1950) in the name of secularism are as follows: In 1924, the "Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu" (Law of Unification of Education), which means secularization of education, was accepted. Again in 1926, the "Swiss Civil Code" was adopted, which led to the regulation of the family law in a secular sense. The Arabic alphabet, the language of the Qur'an, was abandoned, and in 1928 the Latin alphabet and Western calendar and time-zone regulations were passed. Also in 1928, article of "the state is a religion" was removed from the Constitution and compulsory religious lessons and Arabic-Persian lessons were removed in secondary education. In 1926, Article 163 of the "Criminal Code" prohibited "using religion as an instrument of politics" and Article 241 prohibited religious officials from using a "religious rhetoric" against state institutions and laws. With the "Law of the Associations" in 1938, it was accepted that associations based on religious sects or cults could not be established. And finally, in 1937, the acts were accepted as crime, which were contrary to the constitutional principle of secularism and aimed to change the social, political and economic order of the state, whether partly or conceptually.

In 1950, "Democrat Party" (DP), which promised “liberalization in religion” became the ruling party and fulfilled most of these promises. The DP government, which became more and more authoritarian in its 10-year rule, was seen as a "return from reforms" by the military staff who founded the Republic accepted as concession from
secularism and after the military coup in 1960, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two ministers were executed. In the mid-1960s, the "Adalet Partisi"-Justice Party (AP), which owned the DP's political heritage, assumed power and was careful to promote both conservative values and secularism. The "Milli Selamet Partisi"-National Salvation Party (MSP-"Welfare Party" after 1980), a predominant party of the ruling "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi"-Justice and Development Party (AKP), was founded in the early 1970s and became a religious-oriented party. The “Anavatan Partisi”-Motherland Party (ANAP), which was ruling after the military coup of 1980, also included religious politics. As it is known, in the Middle East which is geographically and culturally very close to Turkey with the 1980s, "fundamental Islam" has also increased in popularity.

The ruling party AKP, has been in government as a “dominant party” since 2002. As the recent constitutional referendum (April 16, 2017) shows Turkey's society is now polarized. The most important axis of this polarization is the “Islamization of the society”- the sensitivity of the secularism that arises and authoritarian rule of government. Early Republican achievements are not intended to be lost by the half of society. The "New Turkey" discourse and conservative policies that the AKP is constantly using are causing concern in the society that secular achievements will be lost.

The fact that Turkey's modernization has been identified with "Westernization" since the 19th century and that with the rise of the fundamental Islamic movement in the 1980s, at least half of the society owes more to the religion-centred conservative politics. With this social change, social groups who regard their identity as 'Western' based and do not want to make concessions from secularism have moved into a worried and angry reaction and this has been the axis of political conflict in society with regard to the conceptualization of contested modernities. And the reconciling of Islam and Western values is still a problematic issue and debate, both in Turkey and in the Western world, since the new terrorist groups have the claim of having ‘Islamic identity’.
REFERENCES
Ahmad, Feroz (2014). Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu (Emergence of the Modern Turkey). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.


Mardin, Şerif (1992c). Tanzimat’tan Sonra Aşırı Batılaştırma (Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century). In: Türk Modernleşmesi-Makaleler 4 (Turkish Modernisation- Articles 4), pp. 21-76. İstanbul: İletişim.


Mardin, Şerif (1998a). Yeni Osmanlı Düşünsesinin Doğuşu (Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought). İstanbul: İletişim.


Özbudun, Ergun (2013). Osmanlı Modernleşme Hareketleri: Tanzimat Dönemi (Ottoman Modernisation Movements: Tanzimat Era). In: Türkiye’nin Siyasal
Contested Modernities: ‘Diverse Voices’ of the Pioneering Journalists in the Ottoman Empire

Gelişmesi (Political Development of Turkey). Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayın No: 2223.


Yeğen, Mesut (1999). Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu (Kurdish Issue in the Discourse of the State). İstanbul: İletişim.